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Abstract
Predictive processes are crucial not only for interpreting the actions of individual agents, but also to predict how, in the
context of a social interaction between two agents, the actions of one agent relate to the actions of a second agent. In the
present study we investigated whether, in the context of a communicative interaction between two agents, observers can
use the actions of one agent to predict when the action of a second agent will take place. Participants observed point-light
displays of two agents (A and B) performing separate actions. In the communicative condition, the action performed by
agent B responded to a communicative gesture performed by agent A. In the individual condition, agent A’s communicative
action was substituted with a non-communicative action. For each condition, we manipulated the temporal coupling of the
actions of the two agents, by varying the onset of agent A’s action. Using a simultaneous masking detection task, we
demonstrated that the timing manipulation had a critical effect on the communicative condition, with the visual
discrimination of agent B increasing linearly while approaching the original interaction timing. No effect of the timing
manipulation was found for the individual condition. Our finding complements and extends previous evidence for
interpersonal predictive coding, suggesting that the communicative gestures of one agent can serve not only to predict
what the second agent will do, but also when his/her action will take place.
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Introduction
Perception of the actions of conspecifics works by prediction. At
the most basic level, from seeing the start of a movement, human
observers can anticipate how it will end [1]. For instance, by
looking at a person throwing a dart on a target board, observers
can predict the landing position of the dart on the board [2].
Similarly, observers can anticipate the direction and depth of
a badminton or a tennis stroke [3–7], predict the fate of
a basketball shot [8] or determine whether a player is about to
throw a ball or mimic a throw [9]. In more complex situations,
predictive processes allow humans to understand others’ intentions
and anticipate what they will do next [10]. For example, from
seeing someone grasping an object, observers can anticipate
whether the object is grasped with the intent to cooperate,
compete, or perform an individual action [11], [12].
Recent evidence suggests that action anticipation is crucial not
only for interpreting the actions of individual agents, but also to
predict how, in the context of a social interaction between two
agents, the actions of one agent relate to the actions of a second
agent. This was first demonstrated by Neri, Luu, and Levi [13] in
the context of interpersonal activities requiring close-body contact
such as fighting or dancing. Participants observed point-light
displays of two fighters masked with noise dots scattered all over
the screen. Visual detection of the target agent was better when the
agent was embedded in a fighting sequence with the second agent
acting synchronously as opposed to asynchronously, even though
synchronization was irrelevant to the visual discrimination task.
Manera and colleagues [14], [15] reported a similar effect for
communicative interactions, in which no physical contingency is
implied between the movements of two interacting agents.
Observing the communicative gesture of the first agent enhanced
visual detection of the second agent in a simultaneous masking
detection task. These findings suggest that in the context of a social
interaction the actions of one agent serve as predictors for the
expected actions of the other agent [14]. However, little is known
about the timing of this ‘interpersonal predictive coding’ during the
observation of communicative interactions. Do observers use the
communicative actions of one agent to predict when the action of
the second agent takes place?
It has been proposed that inferences about the course of actions
are based on real-time predictions, running time-locked to the
observed action [16]. In accordance with this proposal, prediction
of temporally occluded actions has been shown to be best for
actions in which the occluder duration matches the movement
gap, i.e., the duration of the unseen part of the action [17], [18].
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether real time
action prediction mechanisms extend to interacting dyads.
Time poses serious constraints on many interactive activities.
Indeed, as the time window for coordination is often very narrow,
actors must achieve a close temporal coordination for acting
synchronously or in turn [19], [20]. We reasoned that if
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interpersonal predictive coding is sensitive to these timing aspects
of interactions, then altering the timing of the action of one agent
should affect the processing of the action of the other agent. To
evaluate this hypothesis, we systematically manipulated the timing
of the actions of two agents in a simultaneous masking detection
task.
Participants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and
B) performing separate actions. In the communicative condition,
the action performed by agent B (squatting down) responded to
a communicative gesture performed by agent A (asking to squat
down). In the individual (control) condition, agent A’s communi-
cative action was substituted with a non-communicative, unrelated
action (turning). For each type of action sequence (communicative
vs. individual), we varied the onset of agent A’s action, in order to
obtain three different time sets (‘+0’, ‘+20’, ‘+40’). If interpersonal
timing is crucial for predicting the action of the second agent, then
visual detection of agent B in communicative trials should be best
when the action of agent A is displayed according to the original
timing (‘+0’). As delaying the onset of A’s action introduces
a temporal error in the prediction of B’s action, performance
should deteriorate with increasing distance from original timing
(‘+20’, ‘+40’, corresponding to a delay of 667 ms and 1333 ms,
respectively). In contrast, no effect of the timing manipulation
should be expected in individual trials, as the actions of agent A
and B then are unrelated.
Methods
Participants
Twenty undergraduate and graduate students from the
University of Turin (8 male and 12 female, mean age = 24 years,
age range 18–31) volunteered to take part in the experiment. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had provided informed
consent, and were naı¨ve with respect to the purpose of the study.
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of two point-light figures with 13 markers
indicating the head and the center of the major joints of each actor
(shoulders, elbows, wrists, hips, knees, and feet). Two action
sequences were selected from the Communicative Interaction
Database [21]: a communicative action sequence and an in-
dividual action sequence. The communicative sequence displayed
a communicative interaction between two agents (A and B): Agent
A asks agent B to squat down, and agent B squats down. The
individual sequence was created by substituting agent A’s communi-
cative action with a non-communicative action with the same
onset and duration: Agent A turns around, and agent B squats
down. Stimuli were constructed in accordance with the motion
capture procedures described in detail in Dekeyser, Verfaillie, and
Vanrie [22]. For the communicative sequence, the actions of the
two actors were captured at the same time, in order to guarantee
that B’s response matched A’s communicative gesture in all
respects (e.g., timing, position, and kinematics). The distance
between A and B during stimulus acquisition was about two
meters. For the individual sequence, A’s action was captured while
the actor was acting alone, and was then coupled with B’s action.
The duration of each action sequence was 3600 ms.
For each type of action sequence (communicative versus
individual), three different temporal sets were assembled: ‘+0’,
‘+20’, ‘+40’ frames. The ‘+0’ motion set was assembled to
reproduce the original timing of the actions of the two agents. In
the ‘+20’ motion set, 20 static frames were added at the beginning
of A’s action, so that the onset of A’s action was delayed by 667 ms
(frame rate was 30 frames/s). In the ‘+40’ motion set, 40 static
frames were added at the beginning of A’s action, so that the onset
of A’s action was delayed by 1333 ms. To equate stimulus
duration, 40 static frames were added at the end of agent B’s
action in the three temporal sets. The resulting duration for each
stimulus was 148 frames (corresponding to 4933 ms; see Figure 1).
Stimuli identification. Before testing the impact of the
timing manipulation on the detection of biological motion in
a mask, we performed a preliminary experiment aimed at
evaluating the effects of the timing manipulation on stimulus
identification (in the absence of a mask). 111 students from the
Faculty of Psychology at the University of Turin (12 male and 100
female; mean age = 22.1 years, age range = 19–58) took part in
the experiment. All participants were naive as to the purpose of the
study and had no previous experience with point-light displays.
None of the participants involved in the preliminary experiment
took part in the main experiment. Participants were tested in
a group setting, in a conference room with a central projection
screen. Viewing distance ranged from 5 to 20 m. Participants were
presented with three-quarter views (i.e., agents shown in a depth-
orientation between the frontal orientation – in which the actors
are facing the observer – and a sagittal orientation – in which the
actors’ facing direction is orthogonal to the observer’s line of sight;
the three-quarter view corresponded to the 125u reference
orientation used in the CID [21]) of the communicative and the
individual action sequences in the three timing sets (+0, +20, +40).
After each stimulus presentation, they were asked to report
whether the two agents were communicating or acting in-
dependently of each other. All participants (100%) correctly
identified the individual action sequence as non-communicative.
The communicative action sequence was correctly identified as
communicative by 110 out of 111 participants (99%) in the ‘+0’
motion set. Forty-eight participants (43%) classified the commu-
nicative sequence as communicative in the ‘+20’ set. Only 8
participants (7%) classified the communicative sequence as
communicative in the ‘+40’ set, suggesting that the action of
agent A occurred too late for B’s action to be interpreted as
matching A’s communicative request.
Apparatus and procedure
Stimuli were displayed on a 15.4-inch WXGA screen (display
resolution: 12806800; refresh rate: 60 Hz) using MatLab (7.1
version) software. Viewing distance was 60 cm. Dots (subtending
approximately 0.14 deg each) were black against a grey back-
ground. The visual angle between the points attached to the head
and the feet was about 7.15 deg. Participants were tested
individually in a dimly lit room.
A two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigm was em-
ployed. Each trial consisted of two intervals, a target interval
(containing agent B) and a nontarget interval (not containing agent
B), with a 500 ms fixation cross (black against a grey background)
in between. In the target interval, B’s actions were displayed using
the limited lifetime technique (see below) and masked with limited
lifetime noise dots [13], [23] (see Figure 1). Each signal dot was
presented for a fixed duration or ‘lifetime’ (200 ms) at one of the
13 possible locations, then disappeared, and reappeared at another
randomly chosen location. Six signal dots per frame were shown.
However, dot appearance and disappearance were asynchronous
across dots in order to avoid motion transients from simultaneous
transitions of all sampling dots. Thus, the 200 ms lifetime of
a single dot partly overlapped with the 200 ms lifetime of other
dots. Note that this implies that the visible lifetime of some dots
was actually shorter in the first 200 ms and last 200 ms of the
Time Will Show
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stimulus presentation. For these dots lifetime already started or
should proceed but was partly not visible because the presentation
of the point-light stimulus had not yet started or had already
ended, respectively. Noise dots had the same trajectories, size, and
duration as the signal dots, but were temporally and spatially
scrambled (they appeared in an area subtending approximately
a 8.6u614.3u region and were displayed for the whole duration of
the stimulus, i.e., 148 frames; see Stimuli section). The number of
noise dots was adjusted individually for each participant during
a training session (see below).
In the nontarget interval, agent B was substituted by limited
lifetime scrambled dots obtained by temporally scrambling the
signal action. Noise dots were also added so as to obtain the same
number of dots as displayed in the target interval. On average,
positions and motions of the dots in the nontarget interval equaled
those of the target interval (see also [13]). In both the target and
the nontarget intervals, A was neither limited lifetime nor masked.
Participants were asked to decide which interval contained
agent B as opposed to no agent. Responses were given by pressing
one of two keys on a keyboard (a left key when the target interval
was presented as the first interval, a right key when the target
interval was presented as the second interval). To prevent
participants from using the onset of B’s action as a cue to
accomplish the task, +10, 0, or 210 static frames were randomly
added at the beginning (and at the end) of all action sequences.
Each participant completed three blocks of 36 trials (2 types of
action sequence, by 3 timing sets, by 18 repetitions). Each block
consisted of trials of communicative and individual action
sequences in the three timing sets presented in a randomized
order. Blocks lasted approximately seven minutes each and were
separated by a rest period of one minute. Accuracy feedback was
given after each block. Before starting the experiment, participants
completed a training session, in which they were presented with
the actions of a single agent masked with different levels of noise
dots (see below).
Training session
Before the actual experiment, the number of noise dots was
adjusted individually for each participant during a training session.
Each trial consisted of two intervals, a target interval (containing
agent B) and a nontarget interval (not containing agent B), with
a 500 ms fixation cross in between. In the target interval, B’s
‘squatting down’ action (148 frames) was displayed using the
limited lifetime technique and masked with limited lifetime noise
dots (see Apparatus and Procedure section). In the nontarget
interval, agent B was substituted by limited lifetime scrambled dots
obtained by temporally scrambling the signal action. Noise dots
were also added so as to obtain the same number of dots as
displayed in the target interval. Participants were presented with
five levels of noise (5, 10, 20, 40, and 80 noise dots) in a 2AFC task.
Each participant completed three blocks of 30 trials (5 noise levels
by 18 repetitions). Trials in each block were presented in
a randomized order. Individual noise levels were determined by
fitting a cumulative Gaussian function to the proportion of correct
responses and determining the 75% threshold. The minimum
noise level allowed was five noise dots (M = 28.3, SD = 26.4).
Results
The mean proportion of correct responses was .78 (score
range = .62–.93). In order to compare participants’ performance
for communicative and individual action sequences in the three
timing sets, criterion (c) and sensitivity (d’) parameters were
extracted [24]. For each participant we calculated the proportion
of hits (arbitrarily defined as ‘‘first interval’’ responses when the
target was in the first interval) and false alarms (‘‘first interval’’
Figure 1. Experimental conditions. Left, upper panel. Example of communicative signal trial (single frame). Agent A asks agent B to squat down;
agent B squats down. B is presented using limited-lifetime technique and masked with temporally scrambled noise dots. Left, lower panel. Example of
individual signal trial (single frame). Agent A turns around; agent B squats down. Right panel. Representation of the three timing sets (‘+0’, ‘+20’ and
‘+40’). The duration of the action of agent A (black line) and B (gray line) in both the communicative and the individual condition is 148 frames
(4933 ms). Triangles indicate key kinematic landmarks characterizing the observed action sequences. The black triangles represent the moment in
time in which A’s hand begins to move up to signal B the up/down movement path (first change in the vertical position compared to frame 0 of the
right wrist dot). The gray triangles represent the moment when B starts to squat down (first change in the vertical position compared to frame 0 of
the right hip dot). Dashed lines represent static frames added to equate stimulus duration across timing sets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054949.g001
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responses when the target was in the second interval) for each type
of sequence in the three timing sets. Proportions of 0 were replaced
with 0.5/N, and proportions of 1 were replaced with (N-0.5)/N
(where N is the number of ‘‘first interval’’ and ‘‘second interval’’
trials).
Criterion values ranged from 2.40 to .54 (M= .04, SD= .28) for
the communicative action sequence (+0, M= .06, SD= .33; +20,
M=2.02, SD= .28; +40, M= .08, SD= .53), and from2.40 to .43
(M=2.04, SD= .21) for the individual action sequence (+0,
M= .02, SD= .29; +20, M=2.06, SD= .42; +40, M=2.08,
SD= .25). In none of the experimental conditions did c differ from
zero (one-sample t-test, t ranging from 21.35 to .88; p ranging
from .192 to .752), indicating that participants’ responses were
unbiased (i.e., there was no systematic tendency to respond ‘first
interval’ or ‘second interval’). An analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with type of action sequence (communicative vs. individual) and
timing set (+0, +20, +40) as within-subjects factors revealed no
significant effect.
Sensitivity values ranged from .46 to 1.97 (M= 1.24; SD= .41)
for the communicative action sequence (+0, M= 1.50, SD= .46;
+20, M= 1.21, SD= .60; +40, M= 1.00, SD= .56) and from .07 to
2.07 (M= 1.20; SD= .54) for the individual action sequence (+0,
M= 1.20, SD= .76; +20, M= 1.17, SD= .64; +40, M= 1.23,
SD= .62) (see Figure 2). An ANOVA on d’ with type of action
sequence (communicative vs. individual) and timing set (+0, +20,
+40) as within-subjects factors revealed a significant interaction
effect between type of action sequence and timing set
(F(2,38) = 3.38; p= .045). No main effect of type of action sequence
(F(1,19) = .08; p= .776) and timing set (F(2,18) = 2.60; p= .087) was
found.
In order to further explore the interaction between type of
action sequence and timing set, d’ for the communicative and the
individual action sequences were submitted to separate ANOVAs,
with timing set as within-subjects factor. For the communicative
action sequence, results revealed a significant effect of timing set
(F(2,38) = 6.65; p= .003), with d’ decreasing linearly from the ‘+0’
motion set, to the ‘+20’ motion set, to the ‘+40’ motion set (linear
contrast, F(1,19) = 19.00; p,.001). For the Individual condition, no
significant effect of timing set was found (F(2,38) = .06; p= .940).
Enhancement by congruent pairing versus disruption by
incongruent pairing
The main effect of timing set on d’ for the communicative action
sequence may have arisen in one of two ways: enhancement by
congruent pairing with the action of agent A, or disruption by
incongruent pairing with the action of agent A (or both). To
distinguish between these two possibilities, we compared d’ data
points from the main experiment with those obtained in the
training session, where the action of agent B was displayed in
isolation. The noise level selected at the end of the training session
corresponded to 75% of correct responses, i.e., d’ = .95 (assuming
c= 0; see dashed line in Figure 2). In the main experiment mean d’
(across action sequences and timing sets) was significantly greater
than .95 (t(19) = 2.94; p= .009), suggesting a general enhancement
in performance (likely due to a practice effect). For the
communicative action sequence, enhancement by congruent
pairing was evident in the ‘+0’ motion set (t(19) = 5.34; p,.001).
By contrast, d’ did not significantly differ from .95 in the ‘+20’’ set
(t(19) = 1.92; p= .070) and in the ‘+40’’ set (t(19) = .38; p= .708). For
the individual action sequence, no enhancement or disruption was
found at any time shift (t ranging from 1.51 to 2.01; p ranging from
.059 to .148). This suggests that visual discrimination of agent B in
communicative trials was enhanced by congruent pairing with the
action of agent A, rather than disrupted by incongruent pairing.
Correlation between d’ and action identification
To explore the role of interpersonal predictive coding further,
we verified whether visual detection of agent B in communicative
trials correlated with the impact of the timing manipulation on
recognisability of the stimuli. To test this, we correlated the
percentage of participants who correctly identified the communi-
cative action sequence as communicative in the three timing sets
(measured independently in a preliminary experiment, see
Figure 2. Sensitivity. Sensitivity (d’) for the communicative (black line) and individual (gray line) condition in the three timing sets. Error bars
represents standard errors. The dashed line (d’ = .95) represents the 75% correct responses level selected during the training session, in which agent B
was presented alone.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054949.g002
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Methods section, Stimulus identification) with d’ in the three
timing sets. Stimulus identification was found to be positively
correlated with d’ (r(1) = 1.00; p= .022). This suggests that the more
the action sequence was identifiable as communicative, the better
observers were able to detect the presence of agent B.
Discussion
To successfully engage in interactive activities such as carrying
a table together, dancing a waltz, or playing football, actors must
be able to adjust their actions to those of the other person,
choosing an appropriate complementary action to be performed at
an appropriate time. This requires the ability to predict what others
will do next, but also when their actions will take place, i.e., to
generate predictions about the timing of others’ actions [20].
Previous evidence suggests that, in the context of interactive
activities between two agents, the actions of one agent can be used
to predict what the second agent will do, even if no physical
contingency between the actions of the two agents is implied [14],
[15]. Here we show for the first time that interpersonal predictive
coding incorporates timing aspects: Temporal coupling between
the actions of two agents (A and B) engaged in a communicative
interaction increased the participants’ ability to detect the presence
of the second agent (agent B). Detection performance deteriorated
linearly as the action of agent A was delayed with respect to the
original timing. In contrast, no effect of the timing manipulation
was observed for individual trials, in which the action of agent A
was not related to the action of agent B. These findings suggest
that, in the context of communicative interactions, the actions of
one agent are used to generate predictions about the timing of the
action of the second agent. The question arises how this can be
achieved.
According to current theories of motor control, observers
generate precisely timed predictions about the sensory conse-
quences of their actions whenever they plan to move, relying on
so-called forward models [25]. It has been proposed that these
already existing real-time forward models for the control of one’s
own actions may also be used to predict the actions of others [17],
[18], [26–31]. Observing others’ actions activates corresponding
representations in the observer’s motor system, and these
representations might enable the observer to generate predictions
by running real-time internal simulations. In this account,
perceptual and motor systems share representations for actions
[32] and the same predictive mechanism used to anticipate the
sensory consequences of one’s own movement may be employed
to predict the timing of others’ actions.
Findings on real-time simulation processes support this idea
[17], [18], [33], [34]. Graf and colleagues [17] demonstrated that
internal action simulation runs time-locked to the real action, even
when the action is covered by an occluder. Observers viewed brief
videos of point-light actions, followed by an occluder and a static
test posture. They were instructed to judge whether the test
stimulus depicted a continuation of the action in the same
orientation or in a different orientation. Results showed that
performance was best when occluder time and movement gap
corresponded, and decreased with increasing time distance.
Adding a concurrent motor task, Springer and colleagues [34]
found that this distance function is modulated by motor execution.
This supports the assumption that i) action prediction operates in
real-time; and ii) motor processes are involved in real-time
predictions.
One way in which such real-time simulation may contribute to
interpersonal predictive coding is by running multiple simulations
[35], [36]. Observers may run multiple action simulations to
predict how, at any moment, the action of one agent should relate
to the action of a second agent. This way, motor simulation might
support various forms of interpersonal coordination, from
resonant imitation to more complex forms of joint and comple-
mentary action, where the spatiotemporal features of one
individual’s behavior are different from, but systematically related
to, those of another individual [37].
Another, more simple, way in which the timing of the second
agent’s action may be predicted in the context of a communicative
interaction is by shifting from symmetrical simulation to reciproc-
ity. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation, Sartori
and colleagues [38], [39] found that observation of an action
sequence does not inevitably lead to symmetrical simulation:
When the action evokes a complementary response, a shift from
symmetrical simulation to reciprocity is observed in the partici-
pants’ corticospinal activity. This shift appears to take place at an
early stage of action observation, suggesting that observers rely on
advanced motor information to anticipate the agent’s intention
and prepare a appropriate complementary response [11], [12],
[40] (for review, see [10]). Provided that the actions of two agents
are related in time, the transition from symmetrical simulation to
reciprocity during observation of communicative actions might be
used to predict ‘what’ aspects, but also ‘when’ aspects of the second
agent’s response. Future studies measuring motor activation
during interpersonal predictive coding may help to clarify whether
and to what extent modulation of motor excitability during
observation of agent A’s action is predictive of B’s response.
A second issue to be addressed by future investigations is how
real-time predictions interact with high-level processes postulated
in theory of mind and communication research such as mental
state attribution. A range of behavioral and neuroscientific studies
has provided evidence that attribution of intention is deeply rooted
in the actions of interacting agents [41], [42]. The finding that
stimulus identification correlates with real-time predictions com-
plements previous research suggesting that observer take in-
terpersonal timing into account when evaluating the semantics of
an interaction. In the present work we only considered three
delays. Studies using finer temporal resolution may help to
understand how close real-time predictions and high-level pro-
cesses and representations mirror interpersonal timing.
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